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Abstract: On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the regime change in the 
communist world, and the 20th anniversary of Poland’s membership in OECD, 
this paper looks at the growth performance of the former post-socialist coun-
tries by using a much larger sample than earlier studies. These economies 
are located geographically very far from each other, and thus, they are im-
bedded in regions with different growth record. The paper examines whether 
the growth spillover effect from the neighbourhood is important enough to 
explain the vastly different catching-up performances of 45 different post-so-
cialist economies (PSEs). The econometric investigations led to divergent find-
ings. For the sample as a whole, the spillover effect does not carry the same 
significance as compared to the importance of the initial development level 
in 1989. We also found a small, but statistically significant negative impact of 
nation-building for those countries which were newly (re)created. Relative to 
all these factors, the impact of being a landlocked country or having or not 
having a rich natural resource endowment does not seem to have a signifi-
cant effect either. The neighbourhood effect for PSEs is statistically significant, 
but this is not the case for 23 OECD countries which didn’t have a communist 
past in their recent history. But the initial development level (1989) had more 
impact on growth in the case of OECD countries, than in PSE economies.
Keywords: comparative economic systems, growth accounting, neighbour-
hood effect, regional growth effect, contagion effects
1. IntroductionIn 1987, exactly 70 years after the Bolshevik revolution in Rus-
sia, 26 socialist (communist) countries stretched out over 31 percent 
of the land of four continents. Their combined population amounted 
to 34 percent of the world’s total.1 Two-years later, in 1989, this system 
unexpectedly started to collapse. As of end-2014, only two small coun-
tries remained truly faithful to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine: Cuba 
and North Korea. Twenty-five years is a propitious time to reflect and 
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compare which of these former socialist countries were economical-
ly successful or unsuccessful and what the common explanations are, 
and, if there are such generalizable development characteristics (see 
Mihalyi, 2014).
Rich literature is available on the determinants of growth in Post 
Socialist Economies (PSEs). The studies can be divided into two groups 
according to take/do not take into account the spillover effect from the 
neighbouring countries. Based on the latter, the growth depending on 
e.g. the increased productivity of labour and capital (Próchniak and 
Rapacki, 2006) for example countries’ investment rate, the education 
level of the labour force, financial sector development (Próchniak, 2011).
The starting point of our investigation was the observation that po-
litically and culturally all PSEs converged to their geographic neigh-
bours: East Germany to West Germany, Central Europe to Western 
Europe, the Baltic countries to the Scandinavian countries, the Cau-
casian and some Central Asian republics to Turkey and Afghanistan, 
respectively (Treisman, 2014; Brezis and Verdier, 2014). The same 
phenomenon may also be observed in the former African socialist 
countries. The countries which at some point in the 20th century had 
broken away from their geographical neighbourhood as a result of an 
endogenous revolution, Soviet occupation or Soviet-supported na-
tional independence wars and then chose the Marxist-Leninist path 
of development, after 1989-90 returned to their previous trajectory. 
In that, they became, once again, similar to their neighbours. In fact, 
this regression was extremely rapid by any historical measure. In two 
years, by the end of 1991, the worldwide regime change was essentially 
a fait accompli. Thus, in political and social terms, both path depend-
ency and geographic neighbourhood seem to matter. The follow-up 
question is whether the economic growth process is also driven, or 
at least significantly influenced by some kind of spillover effect from 
the neighbouring countries. This is the rationale of the present paper.
Intuitively, such a hypothesis sounds credible. The former Asian 
socialist countries all exhibited rapid growth rates and it is conceiv-
able to assume that China’s spectacular growth helped her southern 
(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and northern neighbours (Kazakhstan 
and Mongolia) as well. One can also argue that the relatively slow-
growing Central European countries may simply have had bad luck, 
as their neighbours in Western Europe, all OECD member countries, 
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could not display such a magnetic growth impact in the period un-
der investigation.2
A relatively large volume of empirical literature pertaining to other 
parts of the world also supports such a hypothesis. Before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, Easterly and Levin (1998) already showed that there 
was systemic regional growth spillover effect across national borders in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Favourable or unfavourable growth performance 
of one’s neighbour tended to influence one’s own long-run growth rate. 
For a larger African sample of 44 countries Collier (2007) found that, 
on average, if neighbours grew at an additional one percentage point, 
this, in turn, raised the growth of the country itself by 0.4 percent. 
A more recent IMF study – Arora-Vamvakidis (2010) – convincingly 
demonstrated that China’s economic growth affected her neighbours 
in a number of ways in both the long and the short-term. Another 
IMF study – Ding-Masha (2012) – presented similar evidence for In-
dia. The results of their panel growth regressions suggest that since 
1995, India’s growth has ample explanatory power for growth in sev-
en neighbouring South Asian countries. Closer to our region, Obiora 
(2009) used VAR models to examine the magnitude and sources of 
growth spillovers to the Baltics from EU countries and Russia, and 
showed that the former ones were more powerful than the latter one.3
Obiora’s, and other studies (see, e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1997; Ades 
and Chua, 1997; Abreu et. al., 2004; Easterly, 2013). attempted to iden-
tify the responsible transmission effects, such as trade, in and outward 
migration, emulation of economic policies, financial flows, or the ex-
change rate. We will not go so far. In this paper, we limit our investiga-
tions to show whether the growth spillover effect is important enough 
to explain the vastly different growth and catching-up performances 
of different PSEs which are located geographically at great distances 
from each other, and thus, they are imbedded in regions with differ-
ent growth records.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we ex-
plain how conducted defining our full set of PSEs and how we selected 
a control group of developed market economies from OECD countries 
which were not, at any point, socialist. Sections 3 and 4 present the 
findings of our econometric analysis, while Section 5 concludes and 
explains the possible reasons why we did not find robust statistical evi-
dence for the growth spillover effect for the post-communist economies.
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2. The country sampleFigure 1, below, is a telling illustration of the shocking diver-
gence in terms of the multiplication of the size of the GDP of differ-
ent PSEs. As one can observe, using this rudimentary measurement, 
the size of the Chinese economy grew 8 times, which is astonishing in 
comparison with the growth of the US economy, which did not even 
double4, not to mention Ukraine, the total GDP of which was actually 
far smaller in 2014 than in 1989. These enormous growth differences 
are attributable to several factors among which the most important 
are the growth (or the decline) of population and the (fast or slow) rise 
in productivity. This needs to be emphasised at the outset, because 
in such long-term comparisons, there is an inherent loop of causality 
between the dependent and the independent variables. Rising popu-
lation usually means a growing labour supply and a rising demand, 
which are conducive to output growth. At the same time, however, in-
sufficient growth usually results in slow or even declining standards of 
living, which may then induce a population exodus. As will be shown 
later, this is not merely a theoretical possibility. This is exactly what 
occurred in some economically unsuccessful PSEs.
Figure 1. The rise of total GDP between 1989 and 2014 in selected countries
GDP ratio (2014/1989) 
Note: The underlying time series were in millions of 2014 US$ at purchasing power parity (PPP) and converted 
to 2014 price level with updated 2011 EKS PPPs. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on The Conference Board Total Economy Database™ (2015).
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As a first step of our quantitative analysis, we compiled the set of 
PSEs, as well as a control group of OECD member countries were 
not, and are not, socialist. The starting year of our investigation was 
1989, while the end-year was 2013 for which we could collect official 
statistical data.
One of the novelties of the present paper is that we made a careful 
attempt to increase the sample of Kornai (1992) referred at the very 
beginning of this paper. In a footnote to the already cited table, Kor-
nai remarked that he could have listed at least seven more countries 
(Guinea-Bissau, Burma, Cape Verde, Guyana, Madagascar, São Tomé 
and Seychelles), because these countries were also ruled by Marxist-
Leninist, one-party dictatorships and they all benefited from the po-
litical, military and financial support of the Soviet Union during an 
extensive period of time.5 But for a variety of reasons he did not in-
clude them in his analysis at the end. As an additional source we used 
the ‘Marxist Regimes’ series, edited by Bogdan Szajkowski, in which 
three more countries were categorized as socialist oriented: Grenada, 
Suriname and the United Republic of Tanzania (for a review of the 
series, see Pryor, 1987). Thus, all in all, the broadest possible cover-
age as of 1987 was extended from 26 to 36 countries. One of the most 
momentous consequences of the collapse of the socialist world sys-
tem was that larger countries fell apart, new countries were created, 
and international borders changed, too. More specifically, six coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, three Baltic nations and 11 further 
states of the Soviet Union regained de facto or de jure independence. 
Two federal states, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia disintegrated. The 
same happened to one African PSE, Ethiopia, when Eritrea re-gained 
its internationally recognised independence in 1991. At the same time 
however, two divided nations (Germany and Yemen) were reunited, 
thus two former socialist countries, East Germany and South Yemen 
fell out from our initial sample. Taking this into account, as of end-
2014 we had 60 PSEs to analyse (see Appendix Table A1). After closer 
inspection however, 15 PSEs had to be discarded from our sample for 
one or more of the following reasons: (i) the country was still commu-
nist; (ii) GDP time series were not available; (iii) the size of the pop-
ulation was smaller than 1 million; (iv) the country is an island with 
no terrestrial neighbours; (v) the country did not have international 
recognition (for a detailed account, see Appendix Table A2, Block A). 
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These considerations left us with 45 PSEs on which the neighbour-
hood effect could be tested.
The starting point of setting up the control group was the official 
list of 34 OECD member states, minus those six countries which are 
PSEs (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slo-
venia). Then five more countries were discarded either because they 
were islands or had very small populations (see Appendix Table A2, 
Block B). Thus, we ended up with a sample of 23 OECDs.
The final step was the inclusion into the database the names of the 
terrestrial neighbouring countries for our total sample of 68 countries 
(45+23). Of course, the neighbours of PSEs are not necessarily PSEs 
themselves and vice versa.
2.1 Growth and contagion – our main data
As already explained above, this paper estimates an empirical model 
of the determinants of the growth in post-socialist economies with 
a focus on contagion effects. The GDP figures were taken from two 
widely-used and methodological almost identical data bases, from the 
Conference Board Total Economy Data Base (hereafter: TED) and its 
predecessor, the Maddison (2009) data base. In the full-sample econo-
metric calculations, our dependent variable, the growth performance 
was measured at constant prices between 1989 and 2013 expressed in 
2013 US$ at purchasing power parities (PPP) calculated with 2005 EKS 
weights.6 In case of missing data, especially for the last 3-4 years in the 
case of some smaller countries, we used extrapolations based on PPP 
volume indices estimated by the World Bank. Among the countries 
which we entered in our data base as ‘neighbouring country’, some are 
small, therefore the spillover effect cannot be significant either, while 
others are not only small but also did not have GDP time series. Thus, 
11 countries were entirely left out from the calculation of the spillo-
ver effect (see Appendix Table A3 for the details and Appendix Table 
A4 for other data sources).
Our measure of cross-border contagion is growth in the terrestrial 
neighbouring countries. In contrast to similar papers, we do not be-
lieve that the length of the common borders is of tantamount impor-
tance. High volumes of trade can be easily realized through a short 
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common border, too. This is particularly true for goods transported 
by train or by pipelines.
There can be several ways to weigh the spillover effect on one PSE 
emanating from more than one adjacent neighbour, irrespective of 
whether the neighbour is a PSE or an OECD member. Accepting the 
argumentation of Easterly and Levine (1998), we weighted this impact 
by the size of the neighbour’s total GDP observed in the year 2001, 
the median year between 1989 and 2013. It seems plausible that Russia 
would be more affected by China than by Latvia, and Poland would be 
affected more by Germany than by Slovakia,7 and it seems to be more 
reasonable for us to use 2001 weights rather than 1989 or 2013 weights.
Table 1 provides a succinct summary of the most important styl-
ized facts of our sample countries of two types. As one would expect, 
the PSEs displayed much larger variation in growth.8
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. dev.
All countries
X4: GDP/capita in 1989 68 245 40 881 12 662 11 357
Y: Growth (GDP ratio: 2013/1989) 68 0.6 8.0 2.12 1.38
X2: Neighbours’ GDP ratio (weighted 2001) 68 0.5 7.9 2.49 1.91
X3: Neighbours’ average growth (unweighted) 68 0.5 5.9 2.09 1.06
X4: Relative development compared to USA in 1989 68 0.6 108.1 33.49 30.04
OECDs      
X4: GDP/capita in 1989 23 7 085 40 881 24 964 9 505
Y: Growth (GDP ratio: 2013/1989) 23 1.2 3.38 1.88 0.66
X2: Neighbours’ GDP ratio (weighted 2001) 23 0.5 2.9 1.70 .56
X3: Neighbours’ average growth (unweighted) 23 0.5 3.0 1.72 .53
X4: Relative development compared to USA in 1989 23 18.7 108.1 66.03 25.14
PSEs      
X4: GDP/capita in 1989 45 245 19 868 6 374 5 629
Y: Growth (GDP ratio: 2013/1989) 45 0.6 8.0 2.25 1.62
X2: Neighbours’ GDP ratio (weighted 2001) 45 0.9 7.9 2.90 2.21
X3: Neighbours’ average growth (unweighted) 45 0.9 5.9 2.27 1.21
X4: Relative development compared to USA in 1989 45 0.6 52.6 16.86 14.89
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3. Testing the main hypothesisAs we noted previously, the general objective of this paper is to 
check whether the economic growth of the terrestrial neighbours af-
fect the growth of a given country. However, before tackling the issue 
at hand and finding out this, we were curious to know whether growth 
itself was influenced by our sample countries’ political past (commu-
nist or non-communist). Thus, we tested the Y = f(X1) equation for 
68 countries using a dummy variable (X1 is PSE = 1 or OECD = 0) to see 
whether the post-socialist past is a sufficient explanation of the GDP 
ratio (Y) – the multiplication of total output between 1989 and 2013. 
The answer is a straightforward ‘no’. The Eta2 was miniscule and statis-
tically non-significant (see the row 1 of Table 2). Furthermore, we ar-
rived to the same result with a more sophisticated ANOVA model and 
the Levine-test. These tests confirmed that the expected growth of the 
two samples (PSE or OECD) is not explained by our dummy variable. 
The rows 2-7 of Table 2 shows the strength of the relationship be-
tween growth and six other variables, from which two (X2 and X3) 
measure the neighbours’ average growth (weighted and unweighted), 
one (X4) serves as a proxy to measure the countries’ initial develop-
ment level. The last three variables (X5, X6 and X7) are dummies to 
control for three particularities of the sample countries: being land-
locked, resource rich or a newly created nation state. The strongest 
significant relationship (meaning medium strength R2 = 0.434) was 
in case of OECDs, between their growth (Y) and their initial develop-
ment (X4). The same value in case of PSEs (R2 = 0.297) is the second 
largest value of Table 2. It shows medium strength also, but to a lesser 
degree. According to our hypothesis, among the six variables involved 
(X2-X7) the neighbours’ growth matters most (X2 or X3). The weighted 
version (X2) which was recommended by the literature results only 
weak relationship with the growth (Y). In the case of PSEs the results 
of the unweighted version (X3) was almost strong as the impact of ini-
tial development (X4) to the growth (Y).
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Table 2. Correlations
No.
Correlation 
between Y and
Countries
PSEs (45) OECDs (23) All (68)
1 X1 – – 0.017**, n.s.
2 X2 0.127* 0.019*, n.s. 0.133*
3 X3 0.281* 0.024*, n.s. 0.262*
4 X4 0.297* 0.434* 0.157*
5 X5 0.033**, n.s. 0.026**, n.s. 0.014**, n.s.
6 X6 0.088** 0.082**, n.s. 0.095**
7 X7 0.252** 0.021**, n.s. 0.123**
where
*: R2    **: Eta2
The interpretation of Eta2 is the same as the R2. R2 was calculated in case of quantitative variables, Eta2 was cal-
culated in case of mixed relationship (between qualitative and quantitative variables, more precisely between 
variables measurable nominal and ratio scale).
Significance level = 0.05, n.s. = not significant
Variables:
Y: Growth (GDP ratio 2013/1989) 
X1: Post-socialist = 1
X2: Neighbours’ average growth ratio (weighted 2001)
X3: Neighbours’ average growth ratio unweighted 
X4: Initial development (GDP/capita1989)
X5: Landlocked = 1
X6: Resource rich = 1
X7: New nation = 1
Moving beyond simple correlations, we experimented with linear, 
logarithmic, hyperbolic, compound, power, growth, exponential and 
logistic regressions. In Figure 2, we plotted our variables with the best 
fitting trend. As it can be seen on the diagram our assumed causal re-
lationship for the entire PSE sample is only moderately strong. There 
are many PSEs far above or below the two trend lines fitted to the data 
points. (The dashed line corresponds to a 1:1 relationship, the thick 
line is the hyperbolic trend.) Clearly many countries, like China or 
Ethiopia, performed a lot better than the neighbours’ spillover effect 
would have justified, while four Central Asian economies, all post-So-
viet states in Asia, remained deeply below the trend line.
Our hypothesis suffered another blow, as we tested the same mod-
els without any weighting (see row X2 of Table 2), which should have 
– according to our original expectation – yielded a smaller R2. How-
ever, the opposite result can be observed. With both models, the pa-
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rameters proved to be significant for our sample of PSEs and the R2-s 
were higher (these regression results are available in Appendix Ta-
ble A5). (Compare the X2 and X3 rows of Table 2.) The one model fits 
all approach does not work in our case. This is supported by the fact 
that as we increased our sample of PSEs from 26 to 45, we arrived 
into an inhomogeneous set, as far as the countries’ growth machines 
are concerned.
A more sophisticated method, the K-means clustering algorithm 
seemingly offers a possibility to save, nevertheless, the neighbourhood 
hypothesis. As Figure 2 shows, through this method we can clearly 
distinguish five well separated clusters with distinctive centres. For the 
largest group, containing 29 PESs our initial hypothesis visibly holds 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, it is 
clear that the members of the other clusters are also very important 
countries – especially China and Russia – therefore it would be foolish 
to exclude them from further investigations, or making a sweeping gen-
eralization on the relevance of the spillover effect for all the 45 PSEs.
Figure 2. Bubble plot of post-socialist countries’ growth explained  
by weighted neighbours’ growth (hyperbolic trend)
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4. Controlling for initial development levels  and other possible factors
One common-sense explanation of the existence of five clusters can 
be the convergence effect, meaning that – ceteris paribus – countries 
with lower initial development levels tend to grow at faster rates than 
richer economies. It is also straightforward to assume that the catch-
ing-up process is non-linear: first, rising then falling with per capita 
GDP levels.
Controlling for initial development is also important for another 
reason. It explains a large part of the dynamics of population growth, 
an issue we have already mentioned in the Introduction. In the least 
developed African countries – both in the PSEs and in other African 
countries with similar level of development – the population doubled 
in a quarter of a century (Table 3 Block A). Even in China where, for 
most of the period under investigation, strict fertility control rules were 
in force,9 the population grew by more than 20 per cent, neverthe-
less. Since our dependent variable (Y) is total GDP (rather than GDP/
capita) this is of pronounced relevance in our comparative analysis.
Table 3. Rising and declining populations in selected post-socialist countries, 1989-2014  
Population ratios 2014/1989
A B
Rising population Declining population
Ethiopia 2.09 Bulgaria 0.77
Tanzania 2.06 Estonia 0.80
Angola 2.05 Latvia 0.81
Cambodia 1.71 Moldova 0.83
Tajikistan 1.56 Ukraine 0.86
Turkmenistan 1.45 Armenia 0.88
Uzbekistan 1.44 Belarus 0.94
Vietnam 1.42 Albania 0.95
Azerbaijan 1.31 Romania 0.95
Kyrgyzstan 1.27 Lithuania 0.95
China 1.22 Hungary 0.95
Macedonia 1.12 Russian Federation 0.97
Source: Authors’ calculation based on TED (2015).
In order to grasp the income level differences in a visually, easily-recognisable fashion, initial GDP capita levels 
were expressed as a percentage of the GDP/capita figure of the USA (X4).
10
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Figure 3. Bubble plot of post-socialist countries’ growth  
as a function of initial development levels
Figure 3 clearly displays a better fit and this is confirmed by the 
R2 value (0.390), which in turn poses the next challenge, whether the 
fit can be improved further by incorporating other frequently used 
explanatory variables. We tested three of such variables (X4, X5, and 
X6) and thus controlled for whether the country is landlocked, rich in 
natural resources and whether the country concerned is a newly born 
nation (Appendix Table A6). The first two (dummy) variables do not 
require additional explanation. World history, but also economic ge-
ography, strongly assert that being a landlocked country is a great 
handicap and there is no need to argue extensively that most coun-
tries, most of the time benefit from a favourable resource endowment.11
In the context of the post-socialist economies, it is an intriguing 
research question to find out whether the challenges of nation-build-
ing – the creation of new institutions, setting up new laws and finding 
nominees to the newly created top positions – are growth enhancing 
or just the contrary. A priori, one can argue in both ways. In the con-
text of Ukraine, for example, Havrylyshyn (2014) convincingly dem-
onstrated with econometric tools that in the first half of the 1990s the 
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newly installed politicians were apprehensive to implement the neces-
sary reform measures and preferred those steps which were consid-
ered part of the nation-building agenda. On the other extreme, many 
analysts contended after the shock of the 2008 international financial 
crisis that the strong reform-determination in Latvia was due to the 
deep conviction of the local political elite that as a newly independ-
ent nation filled with enthusiasm, the ultra-radical reforms would be 
tolerated by the electorate.12 The fact is that nation-building proved to 
be problematic in many other places. The rise of new, ethnically ho-
mogenous states led to a brutal outward migration and therefore to 
a net loss of population in many successor states of the former USSR 
and – to a smaller extent – in the successor states of former Yugo-
slavia. In fact, this could have occurred without changes in borders. 
Among the PSEs of our sample, the largest loss of population occurred 
in Bulgaria, where during the last five years of the socialist system and 
also in the years after 1989, ethnic Turks migrated to Turkey in very 
large numbers.
At this point, however, it is worth noting that in many other PSEs, 
the decline in population was caused by the decline in fertility13, which 
in turn was to a large extent the mirror image (or the consequence) of 
the so-called transformation recession (Kornai, 1994), the prolonged 
and deep annual falls in GDP. This could lead to outward migration, 
which then, as a vicious circle, negatively affected total output.
As we experimented with multivariate regressions with different 
combinations of our independent variables, in all but one case we failed 
to improve our best R2 (0.297) between growth (Y) and the initial de-
velopment (X4) at the 0.05 significance level. Interestingly, a stronger 
correlation was achieved (R2 = 0.366) by extending the model Y = f(X4) 
with the unweighted average growth of the neighbouring countries (X3) 
to Y = f(X4, X3) (detailed results are available in Appendix Table A7).
5. ConclusionsWe compared the growth performance of 45 post-socialist 
economies between 1989 and 2013. Our starting hypothesis was that 
this performance must have been strongly influenced by the growth 
spillover effect of their respective terrestrial neighbours. This assump-
tion was based partly on the characteristics of these countries’ cultur-
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al and political developments after the collapse of the socialist world 
system and partly on the findings of earlier econometric studies per-
formed on different samples of countries from other regions of the 
world economy. To our surprise, the econometric investigations led 
to opposite findings: the neighbourhood effect itself does not seem to 
matter much for the entire sample, but it does hold for 29 countries, 
China, Russia and some other important countries being the impor-
tant, non-negligible exceptions.
Instead, we obtained reasonably strong evidence that the initial 
development level in 1989 explains about one third of the variation 
in growth performance for the entire PSE sample.14 We also found 
a small, but statistically significant negative impact of nation-building, 
meaning that the creation of a new nation-state with all the necessary 
additional institutional building tasks did have a growth-retarding ef-
fect in the analysed period. Startlingly, relative to all these factors, the 
impact of being a landlocked country or having or not having a rich 
natural resource endowment has not seemed to have had a significant 
effect on PSEs.
It is also thought-provoking that those equations, where the growth 
spillover effect did prove to be statistically significant for the entire 
PSE sample, we obtained better fit with unweighted data as compared 
to weighted figures. This might be a relatively new consequence of 
the worldwide globalisation process generated by continuously fall-
ing relative transport and communication costs and improved logis-
tics. As these improvements unfold, immediate terrestrial proximity 
tends to lose its importance. Consider two examples. In the case of 
the Hungarian automobile industry, the intra-industry trade links with 
Germany (which is not a neighbouring country) are clearly more im-
portant than the eventual direct impacts from Austria, because two 
large German manufacturers (Audi and Mercedes) built subsidiaries 
in Hungary. Another example is the large scale migration outflow of 
both low and high skill workers from the new EU member states – 
like Lithuania, Poland or Romania – where the physical distance of 
the target countries are almost irrelevant as a result of the affordability 
of discount airline tickets. This may denote, though, that the growth 
spillover effect remains important for the PSEs at the regional level.
An additional source of our weak correlation results may have 
arisen from the fact that the worldwide convergence process appears 
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to have slowed down significantly after its peak in 2008. Since then, 
growth has fallen sharply in many emerging economies.15 Despite the 
rich world’s feeble recovery in the wake of the financial crisis, emerg-
ing economies, including PSEs are now catching up more slowly with 
the OECDs, if at all. In technical terms, we have a structural break in 
our underlying growth time series.
To sum up all these findings, perhaps the best approach can be 
borrowed from a different discipline. On the first page of his classical 
novel, Anna Karenina, Lev Tolstoy famously said ‘happy families are 
all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’. It would 
be reassuring to state the same about the economic success of PSEs 
during the economic transition. Unfortunately, even less seems to be 
true. Both the catching up and the lagging economies have their own 
individual stories. At least, so far, we have not found enough common 
explanation for both groups of post-socialist economies.
Endnotes
1 See Kornai (1992) encyclopaedic work for his list of 26 countries (reproduced in Appendix Table 
A1) which were for a considerable period of time controlled by Marxist-Leninist parties, using 
Soviet-type command economy methods based on state ownership of the means of produc-
tion.
2 Gauged by the same scale used in Figure 1, the ratio of GDP growth in Germany, “the engine of 
Western Europe” was merely 1.4 times, smaller than the Polish and Czech figure, but larger than 
the Hungarian one.
3 An alternative approach is when the direct neighbours’ growth is not used as an explanatory 
variable, but rather that of the member countries of the institutionalised regional trade agree-
ment to which the analyzed country happens to belong. See Behar (2008).
4 In 2014, the absolute size of Chinese economy measured on the scale used in Figure 1, already 
surpassed that of the USA by a small margin (cca. 1%).
5 There are at least two countries, where only this last criterion is not met. As it is well-known, the 
Chile an socialist regime symbolised by the name of President Salvador Allende existed only 
between 1970 and 1973. On the African continent, the country previously called Upper Volta, 
embraced the pan-socialist ideology and voluntarily pursued Soviet-type nationalization under 
a military ruler, named Thomas Sankara as from 1983. The following year, Sankara changed the 
name of his country to its present one, Burkina Faso, meaning “the country of honest people”. 
But in 1987, Sankara along with 12 other officials were killed in a coup d’état and then all his poli-
cies were reversed.
6 For the reason of full-comparability, the time scope of the independent variables was also 1989-
2013, even if some data were already available for 2014 at the time of completing the present 
paper. The definition of EKS method: “A multilateral method developed by O. Éltető, P. Köves 
and B. Szulc that computes the nth root of the product of all possible Fisher indexes between n 
countries. It has been used at the detailed heading level to obtain heading parities, and also at 
the GDP level. EKS has the properties of base-country invariance and transitivity”, http://stats.
oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5525.
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7 In 2001, the total GDP of Germany was 37-times larger than that of Slovakia.
8 The detailed results are available from the Authors at request.
9 Beginning from 1970, citizens were encouraged to marry at later ages and have only two chil-
dren. The one-child policy was officially appraised and mandated in 1979. By and large, it is still 
in force.
10 GDP per capita in 2013 US$, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS PPPs.
11 While we are aware of the dangers of the so-called Dutch disease, it is generally true that abun-
dance in oil and minerals is usually a great help for both developing and developed economies.
12 See Åslund and Dombrovskis (2011). In a way, this is a variant of the Olson-effect, meaning that 
the collapse of the previous (Soviet-type) state structures is a plus, because this was an easy way 
to get rid of the inefficient, ossified structures.
13 Between 1989 and 1997, the Bulgarian fertility rate fell from 1.90 to 1.09 – the lowest figure ever 
recorded among all the PSEs, except for East Germany – not included in our analysis, where to-
tal fertility between 1989-95 fell well below 1.0. 
14 In fact, this finding was corroborated in our econometric tests not only for the PSEs, but also for 
the 23 OECDs, as well. 
15 See a convincing presentation of this new phenomenon in The Economist (2014 a,b) and Åslund 
(2013).
16 Its capital city is Brazzaville. Not to be confused with her 16-times larger neighbor (in terms of 
population) on the other side of the Congo River, the Democratic Republic of Congo, with the 
capital city of Kinshasa.
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Appendix
TABLE A1. The list of socialist and post-socialist countries, 1987 and 2014
No. Socialist countries in 1987
Year power 
was attained
No.
Post-socialist countries  
and territories in 2014
Continent – Country name Continent – Country name
EUROPE EUROPE – ASIA
1 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR)
1917 1-15 Russian Federation, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bela-
rus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan
16 - 19 Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South 
Ossetia, Transnistria
2 Albanian People’s Republic 1944 20 Republic of Albania
3 Bulgarian People’s Republic 1947 21 Republic of Bulgaria
4 Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 1948 22-23 Czech Republic, Slovak Republic
5 German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany)
1949
–
6 Hungarian People’s Republic 1948 24 Hungary
7 Polish People’s Republic 1948 25 Republic of Poland
8 Romanian People’s Republic 26 Romania
9 Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia
1945 27-33 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Slovenia, Kosovo
ASIA
10 People’s Republic of China 1949 34 People’s Republic of China
11 Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 1978 35 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
12 Democratic Kampuchea 1975 36 Kingdom of Cambodia
13 Democratic Peoples’ Republic of 
Korea
1948 37 Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Ko-
rea
14 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1975 38 Lao People’s Democratic Republic
15 Mongolian People’s Republic 1921 39 Mongolia
16 Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1954 40 Socialist Republic of Vietnam
41 Republic of the Union Myanmar
AFRICA
17 People’s Republic of Angola 1975 42 Republic of Angola
18 People’s Republic of the Congo 1963 43 Republic of the Congo16
19 Somali Democratic Republic 1969 44 Federal Republic of Somalia
20 People’s Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (South Yemen)
1969
–
21 People’s Republic of Benin 1972 45 Republic of Benin
22 People’s Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia
1974 46 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethi-
opia
23 People’s Republic of Mozambique 1975 47 Republic of Mozambique
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No. Socialist countries in 1987
Year power 
was attained
No.
Post-socialist countries  
and territories in 2014
24 Republic of Zimbabwe 1980 48 Republic of Zimbabwe
49 Republic of Cape Verde 
50 Republic of Madagascar
51 Republic of Guinea Bissau
52 Democratic Republic of São Tomé 
and Príncipe
53 Republic of Seychelles
54 United Republic of Tanzania
55 State of Eritrea
AMERICAS
25 Republic of Cuba 1959 56 Republic of Cuba
26 Republic of Nicaragua 1979 57 Republic of Nicaragua
58 Co-operative Republic of Guyana
59 Grenada
60 Republic of Suriname
Addendum (1)
27 Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Burma
1962
28 Cape Verde 1975
29 Republic of Guinea Bissau 1973
30 Co-operative Republic of Guyana 1961
31 Democratic Republic of Madagascar 1975
32 Democratic Republic of São Tomé 
and Príncipe
1975
33 Seychelles 1977
Addendum (2)
34 Grenada 1974
35 Suriname (Socialist Republic) 1980
36 United Republic of Tanzania 1961
Categorisation in 1987: 1-26 based on Kornai (1992) Table 1.1, pp. 6-7. 27-33 (Addendum 1): According to a footnote attached to Kor-
nai’s table, he considered them as borderline cases and they were not included in his analysis. 34-36 (Addendum 2): In the “Marx-
ist Regimes” series, edited by Bogdan Szajkowski two more countries were defined as socialist oriented, namely Grenada, and the 
United Republic of Tanzania. See Pryor (1987).
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TABLE A2. Countries discarded from our data base
A
Country – 
Territory
Continent Still socialist
Internation-
ally disput-
ed territory
Population < 
1 mn  
in 2013
Lack of GDP 
time series
Island
Post-socialist countries
1 Abkhazia Eurasia  x x x  
2 Cape Verde Africa   x  x
3 Cuba America x    x
4 Eritrea Africa    x  
5 Grenada America   x   
6 Guyana America    x  
7 Madagascar Africa     x
8 Montenegro Europe   x   
9
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Eurasia x x x
10
North 
Korea
Asia x x
11
Sao Tome  
& Principe
Africa x x
12 Seychelles Africa   x  x
13
South 
Ossetia
Europe x x x
14 Suriname America   x x  
15 Transnistria Europe  x x x  
Developed market economies (OECD)
B
Country – 
Territory
Continent Still socialist
Internation-
ally disput-
ed territory
Population < 
1 mn in 2013
Lack of GDP 
time series
Island
1 Australia Australia
 
 
 
x
2 Iceland Europe x x
3 Japan Asia  x
4 New Zealand Australia  x
5 Luxembourg Europe x  
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TABLE A3. Very small land neighbouring countries
Country Relevant for…
Population < 1 
million
Discarded due 
to the lack of GDP 
time series
1 Gibraltar Spain x x
2 Ceuta and Melilla (Morocco) Spain x x
3 Liechtenstein Austria, Switzerland x x
4 Vatican City
Italy
x x
5 San Marino x x
6 Andorra France, Spain x x
7 Monaco France x x
8 Macau
China
x x
9 Bhutan x x
10 Belize Mexico x x
11 Eritrea Ethiopia x
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TABLE A4. Data sources and variables
Data Source
GDP TED, Maddison, World Bank
Population for GDP/capita World Bank
Countries’ land countries
Countries’ landlocked nature
Countries’ resource rich nature
CIA World Factbook
CIA World Factbook
IMF (IMF, 2012)
Variables Measured by
dependent variable:
Y growth of examined country
independent variables:
X1 countries post-socialist nature or not dummy variable: 0 (not post-socialist), 
1 (post-socialist)
X2 land neighbouring countries’ average growth (2001 
GDP weights)
X3 land neighbouring countries’ average growth
X4 1989 GDP/capita
X5 landlocked country dummy variable: 0 (not landlocked), 
1 (landlocked)
X6 resource rich country dummy variable: 0 (not resource rich), 
1 (resource rich)
X7 nation-building country dummy variable: 0 (not nation-building), 
1 (nation-building)
where: 
i = 1, …, k: examined country (for all country: k = 68, for post-socialist countries: k = 45, for non-post-socialist 
countries: k = 23)
j = 1, …, n: land countries of examined country
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TABLE A6. Codes of dummy variables
Post-socialist
countries
La
nd
l-o
ck
ed
=1
Re
so
ur
ce
 ri
ch
=1
Ne
w
 n
at
io
n=
1
Developed (OECD)
countries (excluding
La
nd
-lo
ck
ed
=1
Re
so
ur
ce
 ri
ch
=1
Ne
w
 n
at
io
n=
1
1 Afghanistan 1 1 0 1 Austria 1 0 0
2 Albania 0 1 0 2 Belgium 0 0 0
3 Angola 0 1 0 3 Canada 0 0 0
4 Armenia 1 0 1 4 Chile 0 1 0
5 Azerbaijan 1 1 1 5 Denmark 0 0 0
6 Belarus 1 0 1 6 Finland 0 0 0
7 Benin 0 0 0 7 France 0 0 0
8
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0 0 1 8 Germany 0 0 1
9 Bulgaria 0 0 0 9 Greece 0 0 0
10 Burma (Myanmar) 0 0 0 10 Ireland 0 0 0
11 Cambodia 0 0 0 11 Israel 0 0 0
12 China 0 0 0 12 Italy 0 0 0
13 Congo, Rep. 0 1 0 13 Korea, South 0 0 0
14 Croatia 0 0 1 14 Mexico 0 1 0
15 Czech Republic 1 0 1 15 Netherlands 0 0 0
16 Estonia 0 0 1 16 Norway 0 1 0
17 Ethiopia 1 0 1 17 Portugal 0 0 0
18 Georgia 0 0 1 18 Spain 0 0 0
19 Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 19 Sweden 0 0 0
20 Hungary 1 0 0 20 Switzerland 1 0 0
21 Kazakhstan 1 1 1 21 UK 0 0 0
22 Kosovo 1 0 1 22 USA 0 0 0
23 Kyrgyzstan 1 1 1 23 Turkey 0 0 0
24 Laos 1 1 0
25 Latvia 0 0 1
26 Lithuania 0 0 1
27 Macedonia 1 0 1
28 Moldova 1 0 1
29 Mongolia 1 1 0
30 Mozambique 0 1 0
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Post-socialist
countries
La
nd
l-o
ck
ed
=1
Re
so
ur
ce
 ri
ch
=1
Ne
w
 n
at
io
n=
1
Developed (OECD)
countries (excluding
La
nd
-lo
ck
ed
=1
Re
so
ur
ce
 ri
ch
=1
Ne
w
 n
at
io
n=
1
31 Nicaragua 0 0 0
32 Poland 0 0 0
33 Romania 0 0 0
34
Russian 
Federation
0 1 1
35 Serbia 1 0 1
36 Slovakia 1 0 1
37 Slovenia 0 0 1
38 Somalia 0 0 0
39 Tajikistan 1 0 1
40 Tanzania 0 1 0
41 Turkmenistan 1 1 1
42 Ukraine 0 0 1
43 Uzbekistan 1 1 1
44 Vietnam 0 1 0
45 Zimbabwe 1 0 0
Total (45) 20 15 24 Total (23) 2 3 1
Share 44% 33% 53% Share 9% 13% 4%
From the total sample of 68 countries 45 (66%) are post-socialist, 22 (32%) are landlocked, 18 (26%) are resource rich and 25 (37%) 
are new nations.
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TABLE A7. The results of multivariate models for PSE countries 
Y: Growth (GDP 2013 /1989)
X1: Post-socialist = 1
X2: Neighbours’ average growth 
 (2001 weights)
X3: Neighbours’ average growth 
 (unweighted)
X4: Initial development
(GDP/capita 1989)
X5: Landlocked = 1
X6: Resource rich = 1 
X7: New nation = 1
n.s.: not significant 
Models Y = f(…)
R2No. models X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
Bivariate models (The results of TABLE A5)
(2) ● 0.127
(3) ● 0.281
(4) ● 0.297
(5) ● n.s. 0.033 n.s.
(6) ● 0.088
(7) ● 0.252
Models involving all potential explanatory variables: only X4 is significant.
(8) ● n.s. ● ● n.s. ● n.s. ● n.s. 0.395
(9) ● n.s. ● n.s. ● n.s. ● n.s. ● n.s. 0.429
Based on Model (4) and (8) is there a multivariate model which R2 > 0.297 and contain any other significant 
variable in addition to the X4?
(10) ● n.s. ● 0.320
(11) ● ● n.s. 0.327
(12) ● ● n.s. 0.312
(13) ● ● n.s.* 0.355
(14) ● n.s. ● ● n.s. 0.363
(15) ● n.s. ● ● n.s. 0.324
(16) ● n.s. ● ● n.s.* 0.378
(17) ● ● n.s. ● n.s. 0.350
(18) ● ● n.s. ● n.s. 0.360
(19) ● ● n.s. ● n.s.* 0.370
Changing X2 to X3:
(20) ● ● 0.366
(21) ● ● ● n.s. 0.409
(22) ● ● ● n.s. 0.369
(23) ● n.s. ● n.s. ● n.s. 0.409
* These parameters would be significant also at the 6% level instead of 5%.

